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of police officers; and (3) the failure of the state to insure protection of the injured party (although the City of Chicago has, on
its own, undertaken this responsibility in part). An entirely new
statute, while retaining the desirable features of the old, should be
enacted. The City of Chicago should become a guarantor of judgments secured against policemen for tortious injuries inflicted by
them in the performance of their duties, rather than an indemnitor;
and this liability should attach in all cases except those where the
injuries result from the "willful misconduct" 33 of the officer. Other
governmental agencies should be similarly responsible for the satisfaction of such judgments. Such a law would eliminate most of
the objections to the present statute. And it might very easily
result in lower costs to the taxpayer while guaranteeing the compensation of the victim; since the city's liability is changed from
that of an indemnitor to that of a guarantor, the city will be liable
only in those cases where the police officer is unable to satisfy the
judgment.
Neither the present statute nor the suggested one actually operates to remove the traditional immunity of municipal corporations
from liability for the acts of agents performing governmental functions. 34 The suggested statute would do what the present statute
purports to do-force the governmental body to assume the responsibility for seeing that the victims of the tortious conduct of
governmental agents are compensated for their injuries.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES
Legal Effect Denied to a Search and Seizure by Congressional Crime Committee-The Senate Crime Committee, while examining a witness who was an
alleged gambler, obtained records and accounts and then directed the witness to lead a policeman to his home in order to obtain a record book. They
neglected to inform him that he had .a right to counsel and that his refusal
to testify or produce records would be inadmissible in a subsequent gambling prosecution in the District of Columbia. The government claimed that
such a search was not unreasonable because the defendant had assented to it.
The reviewing court, however, did not agree, feeling that assent so extorted
is no substitute for lawful process. Nelson v. United States, 22 U.S.L. Week
2014 (D.C. Cir., July 2, 1953). The court felt that the defendant's acquiescence
in the search and seizure was only explainable on the basis of compulsion.
They said that it is clear that if the defendant had been subjected, to the
same day-long pressures in a police station that his assent would not have
been voluntary as a matter of law and that there is nothing to suggest that
33. The meaning of "willful and wanton" at best is perplexing. "Where the omission
to exercise care is so gross that it shows a lack of regard for the safety of others, it will
justify the presumption of willfulness or wantonness. .

. ."

La Cerra v. Woodrich, 321

Ill. App. 107, 110, 52 N.E.2d 461, 463 (1943). Malice is a necessary element of "willfulness" (ibid.). See note 8 supra.
34. See Comment, Tort Claims against the State of Illinois and its Subdivisions, 47
Nw. U.L. REv. 914 (1953).
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a Congressional committee hearing is less awesome than a police station and
should not, therefore, be viewed differently. The similarity, they claimed,
has become more apparent as the investigative activities of Congress have
become less distinguishable from the law enforcement activities of the executive. Thus, although a court cannot enjoin a Congressional committee from
making an unconstitutional search and seizure, it can deny legal effect to
it in an action before it.
Right to a Unanimous Verdict Cannot Be Waived-The defendant was tried
by a jury for the commission of a felony. After retiring the jury returned
in twenty-seven minutes with a report that they were unable to agree. The
court inquired as to whether a majority verdict would be acceptable and the
defendant agreed. The court ordered a verdict of guilty on the basis of a
nine to three split in the jury. The government argued that since a defendant may waive his right to a trial by jury that be could also waive unanimity
on the part of the jury. The Court of Appeals, however, held that the right
to a unanimous verdict could not be waived and that the verdict was void.
Hibdon v. UVited States, 204 F.2d 834 (6th Cir. 1953). The court in support
of its decision pointed to the fact that unanimity was one of the peculiar
and essential features of trial by jury at the common law and that it was
an element of due process that had been necessary from the earliest time.
They reasoned that a jury's unanimity is interwoven with the required
measure of proof and that to sustain the validity of a verdict by less than all
the jurors would be to destroy this test of proof, for there cannot be a verdict
supported by proof beyond a reasonable doubt if one or more jurors remain
reasonably in doubt as to guilt. Thus, it appears that a unanimous verdict
is an essential of due process-a basic protection to those accused of crimeand not a mere technical requirement. Surely a prosecutor would carry a
lighter burden in convincing a majority of the jury than in persuading all
of them and, therefore, unjust convictions would be likely to be increased
and the traditional measure of proof in criminal cases completely destroyed.
Proper Function of the Grand Jury Is to Indict But Not to Make Recommendations to the Executive or Legislative Branches of Government-A federal grand
jury handed up a presentment which contained information regarding its
investigation into alleged perjury violations concerning non-Communist affidavits of various union officials. It also contained recommendations to thl
executive and to Congress that the NLRB revoke certification of certain
unions and that the Labor-Management Relations Act be amended to require
waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination. The United States District
Court held that the grand jury had no right to issue such a report because
such was beyond its power and was in violation of the secrecy requirement.
In re United Electrical Workers, 21 U.S.L. Week 2534 (April 13, 1953).
The court -pointed to the fact that the report had condemned but not indicted
and that it was not within the power of a grand jury to make accusations
which fall short of indictment. The action of the grand jury was also against
the fundamental doctrine of separation of powers. A grand jury is an
appendage of a court and as such its power cannot exceod that of a court.
Thus, it follows that if a court has no power to advise ihe exc-utive and
legislative branches of government neither does the grand jury. The proper
function of a grand jury is only to determine if there is sufficient evidence
for indictment; if not, then it must remain silent.
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Certificate of Innocence Is Not an Absolute Right After Acquittal of MurderThe defendant was found guilty of murder and .assault. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the cause. At the second trial the jury found
the defendant not guilty. The defendant then made a claim for damages in
the Court of Claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1495. In order to proceed in this
action lie requested the district court judge who presided at the second trial
to sign a "certificate of innocence." (See 28 U.S.C. §2513.) This request
was refused and from that order the defendant appealed. The Court of
Appeals held that whether such a certificate shall issue is a matter committed to the discretion of the presiding judge and it is not mandatory-that
such a certificate shall issue. The statute which requires the "certificate of
innocence" as a prerequisite to the civil suit for damages not only demands
that the defendant show that he was acquitted, but that the trial judge
thought he did not commit the acts charged or that, if he did, his acts were
justifiable and, therefore, not criminal. Thus, the effect of the legislation is
to require the concurrence in the not guilty verdict of a thirteenth jurornamely, the trial judge. Rigsbee v. United States, 204 F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir.
1953).
Order Committing the Defendant to the Custody of the Attorney General
Until Mentally Competent to Stand Trial Is Not a Deprivation of Constitutional
Rights and Is a Final Order from Which There Can Be an Appeal-The accused
was indicted for sending libelous and defamatory materials through the
United States mails in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. §1718. The'district court
ordered a hearing to determine the mental competency of the accused,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C.A. §4244, 4246. The court determined that the defendant was an insane person and unable to make a defense to the charges in
the indictment. Commitment was made to the Attorney General "for the
purpose of observation and treatment until such time as said defendant
shall become mentally competent or until further order of the court." The
appeal in Higgirs v. United States, 205 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1953), raises
two important questions. First, is the aforementioned commitment based
upon a final order subject to appeal? The Court of Appeals answered this
in the affirmative by saying that when the mental disturbance of the
accused might be of a long time, perhaps forever, then such an order of
commitment is not of an interlocutory nature, but is a final order which
may be appealed from. Second, are the aforementioned statutes, pursuant
to which the defendant was committed, Constitutional? The court answers
this by stating that, although the federal government has neither the constitutional nor inherent power to enter the general field of lunacy, Congress
has the power to provide for the proper care and treatment of persons
temporarily insane while in the custody of the United States awaiting trial
upon a criminal offense. The order of the lower court is actually less than
a judgment of insanity. It is merely a restraint upon the defendant until
he is mentally competent for trial.
Pennsylvania Grand Jury Denied the Right to Investigate Conditions Leading
to Prison Riots-Subsequent to a prison riot in the Western State Penitentiary in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, the District Attorney petitioned the court
to submit the problem to the grand jury for investigation. The petition was
granted but the Attorney General requested that the order be modified by
limiting grand jury activity to criminal acts committed within the county.
The Superior Court agreed with the plea of the Attorney General.and ruled
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that the lower court had no power to order a grand jury investigation into
the conduct and management of the state penitentiary or to allow the grand
jury to look into any matters which would not lead to criminal prosecution.
The court based its opinion upon the fact that the institution was an arm of
the executive branch. In re Grand Jury Investigation of Conditions at Western State Penitentiary, 96 A.2d'189 (Pa. 1953).
Recent Illinois Statute Permits Pre-Trial Suppression of an Illegally Obtained
Confession-Illinois has recently amended its criminal code so that a defendant will be permitted to suppress an illegally obtained confession by filing a
motion in advance of trial. If the judge finds that the alleged confession is
incompetent he shall so rule and shall suppress it at that time. Thereafter,
this confession may not be offered or received in evidence on the trial of the
case. If, however, the ruling is adverse to the defendant this shall not prejudice his right to show that the alleged confession is incompetent at the time
it is offered in evidence at the trial. Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 38, §736.1 (1953).
Where Defendant Fails to Produce Witness that It Was to His Interest to
Produce, with No Explanation, Jury Could Draw an Inference that the Testimony Would Be Unfavorable to the Defendant-Defendant alleged that a,
third party had caused his accident with the plaintiff and that, therefore, he
was not responsible. Defendant did not, however, produce this third party as
a witness and offered no satisfactory explanation for his failure to do so. The
plaintiffs insisted that they had no knowledge of any such person. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the trial court's instruction that the
jury should consider that this third party was equally available to both plaintiffs and defendants as a witness. It was the feeling of the court that this was
prejudicial to the plaintiffs. They stated the ruling consideration as being
that where evidence is within the control of the party whose interest it would
naturally be to produce it, and, without satisfactory explanation he fails to do
so, the jury may draw an inference that it would be unfavorable to him. Here
producing the third party was to the interest of the defendant and within his
control. When he offered no satisfactory explanation for his failure to produce
this witness the proper inference by the jury would be that this testimony
would be unfavorable to the defendant. Haas v. Kasnot, 92 A.2d 171 (1952).
The Haas case also holds that the police accident report compiled by officers
who had arrived on the scene, but who had not witnessed the accident, was
hearsay. The report is not given the standing of a public record and, therefore,
is not admissible as the U.S. Weather Reports are.
Arrest for Drunken Driving on Private Property-In State v. Harold,246 P.
2d 178 (Ariz. 1952), the defendant was convicted with a second offense of
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor
and reckless driving. The arrest. was made on private property. One of the
defendant's contentions was that the state has no power to regulate automobiles on private property. On appeal, the court held that the legislature
has both the right and the duty to prevent incompetent automobile drivers
from operating vehicles on highways or elsewhere within the borders of
the state to protect the public welfare, and enforcement of such legislation
is within the police power of the state. The court further stated that even
upon private property an intoxicated or reckless driver of an automobile is
just as much a menace to himself or to anyone who may be lawfully thereon
as he would be to those on a public highway.

